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PIGS Do FLY:
A NEW TEST LIMITING THE SCOPE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
[. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided that arbitration clauses are
unenforceable when unforeseeable, outrageous torts are committed against a party.'
In so ruling, the court put defendants on notice that it would no longer allow a
policy favoring arbitration to prevail over the contract and tort principles upon
which both plaintiffs and defendants have depended for centuries.2 In Aiken v.
World Finance Corp. of South Carolina' and Chassereau v. Global-Sun Pools,
Inc.,4 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that arbitration clauses are
inapplicable to acts that are outrageous and unforeseeable. In light of the
overwhelming policy in both South Carolina and federal caselaw favoring
arbitration,5 these decisions were unexpected but welcomed by plaintiffs' attorneys
throughout the state.
In these two cases, the court distinguished between outrageous torts that are
factually related to the performance of the contract and the parties' contractual
relationship itself.6 The court used the reasonable person standard to determine
whether the injured party intended to arbitrate the relevant issue, noting that the
standard is "deeply rooted in tort law. ' 7 This outcome was not anticipated because
prior to the holdings of these two cases, the policy favoring arbitration made it
practically impossible to avoid arbitration if an agreement to arbitrate existed.' The
holdings in Aiken and Chassereau provide a way to avoid arbitration for parties
victimized by the opponent's tortious behavior to the point that arbitration should
not be required. In the two cases, the court formulated a new test to determine
whether disputes should be arbitrated when one party has committed an outrageous,
unforeseeable tort: if a party has engaged in outrageous, tortious behavior
"unforeseeable to the reasonable consumer," the court will disregard any agreement
to arbitrate reached between the two parties. 9
1. Chassereau v. Global-Sun Pools, Inc., 373 S.C. 168, 644 S.E.2d 718 (2007); Aiken v. World
Fin. Corp. of S.C., 373 S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705 (2007).
2. See Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720; Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151,644 S.E.2d at 709.
3. 373 S.C. at 151, 644 S.E.2d at 709.
4. 373 S.C. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720.
5. See, e.g., Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001)
(citing Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 399, 540 S.E.2d 864, 865 (Ct. App.
2000) (noting the policy in favor of arbitration in both state and federal caselaw).
6. Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720; Aiken, 373 S.C. at 152, 644 S.E.2d at 709.
7. Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151 n.6, 644 S.E.2d at 709 n.6.
8. See, e.g., Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 544, 558-59, 606
S.E.2d 752, 760 (2004) (finding an arbitration clause enforceable despite the plaintiff s claims that it
was fraudulent, unconscionable, and a violation of public policy); Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343
S.C. 531,541-42, 542 S.E.2d 360, 364-65 (2001) (finding an arbitration clause enforceable despite the
plaintiffs' claims that it was unenforceable due to unconscionability and lack of mutuality, and that the
clause was invalidated by the State Consumer Protection Code).
9. See Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720; Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151, 644 S.E.2d at 709.
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In an effort to understand all the implications of the Aiken and Chassereau
decisions, Part 11 of this Note briefly reviews the history of arbitration in the United
States and South Carolina. Part ITT then discusses the current theories South
Carolina courts use to declare arbitration agreements invalid. Following a review
of the defenses to the enforceability of arbitration clauses in Part 111, Part IV
examines the Aiken and Chassereau decisions and explains the new method by
which parties can avoid arbitration. Part V concludes with a discussion concerning
the new test for arbitration of claims involving outrageous, tortious conduct, the
effects the decisions will have on South Carolina arbitration law, and the reasons
the court made the correct decision.
I1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
In 1920, New York passed a state arbitration act that provided for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. ° With the support of the newly created
Arbitration Society of America, the New York enactment encouraged other states
and the federal government to create their own arbitration acts." Due to the
popularity of such a policy, Congress passed 12 the "centerpiece of domestic
American arbitration law"'3  the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)14 in 1925.
The main purpose for passing the FAA was to encourage the enforcement of
arbitration clauses where courts had historically refused to do so. 15 This seeming
manifestation of congressional intent prompted courts to enforce arbitration clauses
in almost every case.' 6 However, several commentators have argued that Congress
did not intend for the FAA to sweep so broadly. 7 Professor Sternlight argues that
Congress intended for the FAA to apply only to agreements between merchants
with equal bargaining power.'" During one of the committee hearings concerning
the FAA, W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman of the American Bar Association Committee
on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, testified, "[The FAA] is purely an act
10. Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposalfor Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 797 (2002).
11. Id. at 797.
12. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 4, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000
& Supp. II 2002)).
13. Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L.
REV. 753, 758 (2004).
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
15. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474
(1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
16. See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 10, at 889-90 (discussing how the Supreme Court has
interpreted the FAA to apply to state courts although legislative history shows that Congress actually
intended the Act to apply only to federal courts).
17. Zhaodong Jiang, FederalArbitration Law andState Court Proceedings, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
473, 483 (1990); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at
Twenty: FaitAccompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 297,
334 38 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 647 (1996).
18. Sternlight, supra note 17.
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to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it."' 9 Furthermore, in two
early cases construing the FAA, the Supreme Court's opinions reflect the desire to
protect consumers by requiring that both parties clearly consent to arbitration of an
issue in order for an arbitration clause to be enforceable. 2' This evidence supports
Professor Sternlight's opinion that Congress did not envision the FAA sweeping as
broadly as it currently does.
In later cases, the Supreme Court has stated that in passing the FAA, Congress
"was 'motivated, first and foremost, by a... desire' to change this antiarbitration
rule" that had flooded the nation.2 The goal was to force courts to "place
[arbitration] agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.22 If this was
indeed Congress's goal, Congress certainly achieved it.
Under the FAA, the Supreme Court has stated clearly that if there is an
agreement to arbitrate, a party will find overcoming the presumption in favor of
arbitration practically impossible. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.,3 the Supreme Court stated that "any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability."24 The Court has left little room
for interpretation by state courts. It has made clear that unless a court is certain that
an arbitration clause does not apply to a particular dispute, an agreement to arbitrate
should be enforced.25
Although arbitration provisions have appeared in South Carolina statutory law
since 1896,26 the South Carolina General Assembly did not pass the Uniform
Arbitration Act until 1978.27 Section 15-48-10 of the South Carolina Code states,
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties
is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.28
19. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 4213 and S. 4214, 67th
Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman, ABA Comm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Commercial Law).
20. Sternlight, supra note 17, at 648-49 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S.
198, 200 01, 205 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435, 438 (1953)).
21. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 71 (1995) (quoting Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
22. Id. at 271 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 474 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
24. Id. at 24-25.
25. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
26. 1896 S.C. Acts 193 94.
27. S.C. CODEANN. § 15-48-10 to -240 (2005).
28. Id. § 15-48-10(a).
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It is important to note that the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act does
make exceptions to its applicability.2 9 While the Act upholds the validity of
arbitration agreements generally,3" it does prohibit arbitration of workers'
compensation or unemployment compensation claims,3" prior agreements between
doctors and their patients or lawyers and their clients, 32 and, perhaps most
importantly, personal injury claims based on contract or tort.3 Like the federal
caselaw, 4 South Carolina caselaw has opined that state policy favors arbitration.
5
In language similar to that used by the United States Supreme Court, 6 the South
Carolina Supreme Court has stated, "Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."37 Therefore, before theAiken and
Chassereau decisions in 2007, South Carolina had a policy which, apart from the
noted statutory exceptions, favored arbitration over traditional litigation when a
question existed as to whether a claim was subject to arbitration.
8
Il1. DEFENSES AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN SOUTH
CAROLINA
South Carolina courts have recognized circumstances in which they will refuse
to enforce arbitration agreements. The most common grounds for invalidating an
arbitration agreement are general contract defenses.3 ' However, states may not
create special contract defenses specific to arbitration clauses.40 Though typical
contract defenses of unconscionability, fraud, and duress are always available,
courts rarely invoke any ofthese doctrines besides unconscionability in invalidating
arbitration provisions.4 This Part briefly discusses some of the methods South
29. Id. § 15-48-10(b).
30. Id. § 15-48-10(a).
31. Id. § 15-48-10(b)(2).
32. Id. § 15-48-10(b)(3).
33. Id. § 15-48-1 0(b)(4). This section also prohibits arbitration of claims regarding benefits under
an insurance policy or annuity contract. Id.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 23 25.
35. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) (citing
Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 399, 540 S.E.2d 864, 865 (Ct. App. 2000)).
36. Compare Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 597, 553 S.E.2d at 118 (noting South Carolina's clear policy
favoring arbitration), with Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
23 (1983) (finding that courts usually practice a "rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration
agreements").
37. Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 597, 553 S.E.2d at 118 (citing Towles v. United Healthcare Corp., 338
S.C. 29, 34, 524 S.E.2d 839, 842 (Ct. App. 1999)).
38. See id.
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (2005) (stating that arbitration provisions are enforceable
unless there are grounds "at law or in equity" for revoking the contract); Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 593, 553
S.E.2d at 116 (citing Doctors Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
40. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
41. Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability:
RestoringAccess to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMUL. REV. 819, 851 (2003)
("[D]espite the presumably millions of arbitrations conducted under [FAA] authority since its enactment
in 1925, there are few reported cases invalidating arbitration agreements on traditional contract grounds
[Vol. 59: 513
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Carolina courts have used to invalidate arbitration provisions and then examines the
new method of maneuvering around the state and federal policies in favor of
arbitration.
A. Waiver
First, arbitration clauses may be invalidated if they are waived by the parties.
4 2
The party asserting waiver "has the burden of showing prejudice through an undue
burden caused by a delay in the demand for arbitration."43 Whether a party has
waived the right to arbitration is a fact-specific inquiry. 4 However, there are several
factors that courts consider in determining whether a party has waived its right to
have disputes arbitrated:
(1) [W]hether a substantial length of time transpired between the
commencement of the action and the commencement of the
motion to compel arbitration; (2) whether the party requesting
arbitration engaged in extensive discovery before moving to
compel arbitration; and (3) whether the non-moving party was
prejudiced by the delay in seeking arbitration.45
Initially, courts will consider the amount of elapsed time between the filing of
the suit and the motion to compel arbitration, along with the amount of discovery
that has already taken place.46 For example, in Evans v. Accent Manufactured
Homes, Inc. 47 the court found that Accent waived its rights to arbitrate where it
failed to seek arbitration for nineteen months after commencing the action.48 In
contrast, the court in General Equipment & Supply Co. v. Keller Rigging &
Construction, SC, Inc.49 found that Keller had not waived its right to arbitrate where
only eight months had elapsed between the filing of the action and the filing of the
motion to compel.5"
After analyzing the lapse of time between the filing of the suit and the motion
to compel arbitration, a court will determine if the moving party has engaged in
other than unconscionability.").
42. Toler's Cove Homeowners Ass'n v. Trident Constr. Co., 355 S.C. 605, 612, 586 S.E.2d 581,
585 (2003) (citing Gen. Equip. & Supply Co. v. Keller Rigging & Constr., SC, Inc., 344 S.C. 553, 556,
544 S.E.2d 643, 645 (Ct. App. 2001)).
43. Gen. Equip. & Supply, 344 S.C. at 556, 544 S.E.2d at 645 (citing Sentry Eng'g & Constr., Inc.
v. Mariner's Cay Dev. Corp., 287 S.C. 346, 351, 388 S.E.2d 631, 634 (1985)).
44. Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 336 S.C. 658, 665, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Hyload, Inc. v. Pre-Engineered Prods., Inc., 308 S.C. 277, 280, 417 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ct. App.
1992)).
45. Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 374 S.C. 122, 126, 647 S.E.2d 249, 251 (Ct. App.
2007).
46. Id.
47. 352 S.C. 544, 575 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 2003).
48. Id. at 551, 575 S.E.2d at 77.
49. 344 S.C. 553, 544 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2001).
50. Id. at 557, 544 S.E.2d at 645.
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discovery that has resulted in prejudice to the nonmoving party.5' Finally, in order
to prevail on a defense of waiver, the nonmoving party must show that it will
experience more than a "mere inconvenience" if the court grants the motion to
compel arbitration. 52 To determine this, courts will analyze whether the moving
party has taken "advantage of the judicial system" in ways unavailable if the party
had moved to compel arbitration at an earlier point. 3 If the moving party has
engaged in a significant amount of discovery, the court will likely find that the
nonmoving party has suffered prejudice and the party seeking arbitration has
waived the right, and the court will therefore deny the motion to compel
arbitration. 4
B. Unconscionability
Another defense to the enforcement of arbitration clauses is unconscionability,
which applies to arbitration clauses and contracts in general.55 South Carolina
caselaw defines unconscionability using a two part test: "the absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with
terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair
and honest person would accept them. 56
The test's first prong, whether there was an absence of meaningful choice by
one of the contracting parties, requires the court to determine if the bargaining
process between the parties was fair. 7 In order to make this determination, a court
will look to several indicators: the disparity of bargaining power between the
parties; their levels of sophistication; the nature of the plaintiff's injuries; whether
the plaintiff would be surprised by the existence of the arbitration clause; the
prominence of the arbitration clause in the contract; and whether the plaintiff is a
substantial business concern. 58 In Munoz v. Green Tree Financial Corp.,59 the
51. Compare Evans, 352 S.C. at 551, 575 S.E.2d at 77 (finding waiver where one party had
utilized discovery tools such as depositions, which are not traditionally available in arbitration), with
Gen. Equip. & Supply, 344 S.C. at 557, 544 S.E.2d at 645 (finding no waiver where the parties were
involved in "routine administrative matters and limited discovery which did not involve the taking of
depositions or extensive interrogatories").
52. Rhodes v. Benson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 374 S.C. 122, 127,647 S.E.2d 249,251 (Ct. App.
2007) (quoting Evans, 352 S.C. at 550, 575 S.E.2d at 76 77) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 127, 647 S.E.2d at 251 (quoting Evans, 352 S.C. at 548, 575 S.E.2d at 76) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
54. Id.
55. Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 539, 542 S.E.2d 360, 364 (2001) (citations
omitted).
56. Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 544, 554, 606 S.E.2d 752,
757 (2004) (citing Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, Inc., 322 S.C. 399, 403, 472 S.E.2d 242,
245 (1996)).
57. Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 25, 644 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2007).
58. Id. (citing Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1989)). Any party
attempting to invalidate an arbitration clause for reasons of unconscionability must look to the
arbitration clause itself, not the contract as a whole. See Carolina Care, 361 S.C. at 550 51, 606 S.E.2d
at 755 (citations omitted). While it is difficult to prove unconscionability as a defense to a contract, it
is even more difficult to prove unconscionability in reference specifically to the arbitration clause. If
[Vol. 59: 513
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss3/6
CONTRACT LAW
plaintiffs argued that an arbitration clause, which appeared in their installment
contract and security agreement with the defendant, should be declared
unconscionable because the clause was part of an adhesion contract and because
they were never informed that the arbitration clause was in the contract. 60 The trial
court found that the arbitration clause was unconscionable, but the South Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed, pointing out that adhesion contracts are not per se
unconscionable. 61 The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of
appeals and commented that a "person who can read is bound to read an agreement
before signing it."
6 2
The second prong ofthe unconscionability test asks whether the clause contains
"oppressive" terms.63 In making this determination, a court will look to see if the
clause violates "public policy, statutory laws, or provisions of the Constitution.
' 64
In Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., the arbitration clause in question
contained terms barring the arbitrator from granting punitive damages to either
party.65 Statutes requiring the court to grant such damages governed two of the
allegations in the plaintiffs complaint.66 The court found that the terms of the
arbitration clause were oppressive because they violated statutory laws and their
underlying public policies.67 In Toler's Cove Homeowners Ass'n v. Trident
Construction Co.,68 the court examined whether terms in an arbitration clause
requiring $11,000 in arbitration fees and a deposit by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) constituted oppressive terms for an already defunct
corporation.6 9 The court concluded that the terms were not oppressive because when
the parties actually divided the arbitration fees, the petitioner would only be
responsible for the $2,500 case service fee plus any advance money the AAA
required, all of which would be split among the five parties in the action.7 ° Even
though the court did not find the subject terms oppressive, this case does suggest
that if the cost of arbitration is unreasonably high, or if a party cannot reasonably
afford the expenses associated with arbitration, a court will consider either or both
of those circumstances in determining the fairness of the terms. If the court did find
terms regarding cost to be oppressive, the court could invalidate the arbitration
the party wishing to avoid arbitration cannot prove that the arbitration clause itself is unconscionable,
the defense of unconscionability will fail.
59. 343 S.C. 531, 542 S.E.2d 360 (2001).
60. Id. at 541, 542 S.E.2d at 365.
61. Id. at 537, 542 S.E.2d at 362-63.
62. Id. at 541, 542 S.E.2d at 365 (citing Hoodv. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. ofTenn., 173 S.C. 139, 143,
175 S.E. 76, 77 (1934)).
63. Carolina Care, 361 S.C. at 554, 606 S.E.2d at 757 (citing Fanning v. Fritz's Pontiac-Cadillac-
Buick, Inc., 322 S.C. 399, 403, 472 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1996)).
64. Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 29-30, 644 S.E.2d 663, 671 (2007)
(citing Carolina Care, 361 S.C. at 555, 608 S.E2d at 758).
65. Id. at 28, 644 S.E.2d at 670.
66. Id. at 28-29, 644 S.E.2d at 670-71.
67. Id. at 30, 644 S.E.2d at 671.
68. 355 S.C. 605, 586 S.E.2d 581 (2003).
69. Id. at 613, 586 S.E.2d at 585.
70. Id.
20081
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clause.7' However, the South Carolina Supreme Court has also made it clear that it
will not invalidate an arbitration clause based on a lack of mutuality in its terms.
72
Unconscionability is the defense that most parties typically argue in seeking to
invalidate an arbitration clause. In Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips,73 Hooters
drafted an arbitration agreement that greatly diminished the neutrality of the
arbitration process used with employees.74 One of the challenged provisions
required employees to provide notice to Hooters, including a summary of all
witnesses' statements, at the outset of a claim, but it did not require Hooters to
make "any responsive pleadings" to the employee. 7' The agreement also gave
Hooters control over the membership of the entire arbitration panel: the employee
could only select arbitrators from a list, which Hooters created. 76 Furthermore, the
agreement allowed Hooters, but not the employee, to do any of the following: move
for summary judgment, record or videotape the arbitration proceeding, expand the
scope of the arbitration to include any matter not related in the employee's claim,
terminate the agreement to arbitrate with thirty days' notice, and "modify the
[arbitration] rules, in whole or in part, whenever it wishe[d] and without notice to
the employee."'77 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's invalidation of the
arbitration clause because the terms of the arbitration clause were so biased in favor
of the employer that the company had created "a sham system unworthy even of the
name of arbitration., 78 The court instructed that the focus in determining the
unconscionability of an arbitration clause should be on whether it is evident that the
71. Id. at 613,586S.E.2d at 585-86 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,
92 (2000)) (finding that a party seeking to invalidate an arbitration clause failed to show that arbitration
would be prohibitively expensive); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90-91 & n.2 (2000) (finding that
if an arbitration clause is silent on the issue of how the parties would share arbitration costs, a court
cannot invalidate the clause on the basis that it is cost-prohibitive unless the party proves it is likely to
incur such prohibitive costs); Michael D. Fielding, How to Avoid Arbitration in Bankruptcy: Six
Arguments in Your Arsenal, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/August 2007, at 24, 25 (2007) ("In some
instances, courts have held cost-shifting provisions in arbitration agreements to be cost-prohibitive
and/or unconscionable and thus unenforceable.").
72. Simpson, 373 S.C. at 31,644 S.E.2d at 672. But see Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547, 1549
(1 th Cir. 1985) (stating that under New York law, lack of mutuality is a defense to the enforceability
of an arbitration agreement); Shelly Smith, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
Contracts: Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1191, 1241 (2001) (explaining that in some jurisdictions an arbitration clause that waives the rights of
one party to the judicial system but leaves judicial remedies as an available option for the other party
supports a finding of unconscionability, especially in adhesion contracts).
73. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 938.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 938-39. Hooters did not exclude any potential members of its staff or management from
acting as arbitrators on the panel, nor did the company exclude arbitrators who had familial or financial
relationships with the company. Id. at 939.
77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). These provisions were so one sided that the AAA, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution spoke out in
favor of the employees and stated that they would never agree to enforce such a biased arbitration
agreement. Id.
78. Id. at 940-41.
[Vol. 59: 513
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underlying goal of the agreement is to achieve an unbiased decision made by a
neutral decisionmaker.79
C. Fraud
Another defense to the enforcement of arbitration clauses involves fraud. In
order to invalidate an arbitration clause on the basis of fraud, the party seeking to
avoid arbitration must show that the opposing party fraudulently induced the
signing of the arbitration agreement" by establishing the following elements:
(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4)
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity,
(5) intent that the representation be acted upon, (6) the hearer's
ignorance of its falsity, (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth, (8)
the hearer's right to rely thereon, and (9) the hearer's consequent
and proximate injury.81
Furthermore, the fraud must be specific to the arbitration clause itself.82 Rescission
of an entire contract does not invalidate the arbitration clause unless there is a
separate challenge to the clause. 3
In South Carolina Public Service Authority v. Great Western Coal (Kentucky),
Inc.,84 South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper) entered into
contracts with defendants, collectively referred to as Great Western, to purchase
coal. These contracts contained arbitration clauses. 6 Ten years after the parties
entered into the contracts, Santee Cooper filed a lawsuit against Great Western;
Clyde E. Goins, the company's president; and Joe Norman, a former employee of
the company.87 The lawsuit alleged "civil conspiracy, fraud, fraudulent interference
with an employee contract, and breach of fiduciary duty by Norman."88 Santee
Cooper claimed that Great Western, through Goins and Norman, had raised the
price of the coal but lowered its quality.89 Goins moved to compel arbitration, but
the trial court denied his motion, finding that the arbitration clause was
79. See id.
80. Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 544, 551,606 S.E.2d 752,
755 (2004) (citing S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great W. Coal (Ky.), Inc., 312 S.C. 559, 562, 437 S.E.2d
22, 24 (1993)).
81. Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 41, 557 S.E.2d 676, 680 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Parker v.
Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 482, 531 S.E.2d 546, 558 (Ct. App. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Great W. Coal, 312 S.C. at 563, 437 S.E.2d at 24.
83. Id. at 562-63, 437 S.E.2d at 24.
84. 312 S.C. 559, 437 S.E.2d 22 (1993).
85. Id. at 561, 437 S.E.2d at 23.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Santee Cooper settled with Great Western, and Norman passed away prior to trial, leaving
Goins as the sole defendant in the case. Id. at 561 n.1, 437 S.E.2d at 23 n.1.
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unenforceable because of "fraud in factum." 90 The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the trial court erred because Santee Cooper's complaint did
not contain any allegations of fraud regarding the arbitration clause specifically. 91
Similar to claims of unconscionability, 92 the court found that the party seeking to
avoid arbitration must show that the fraud was specifically related to the arbitration
clause. 9 Thus, South Carolina courts have placed plaintiffs on notice that an
arbitration clause is separable from the contract, which requires the plaintiff to
specifically plead that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiffto arbitrate. 94
D. Duress
Plaintiffs may also seek to invalidate arbitration clauses on the basis of duress.
South Carolina courts have defined duress as coercion that places a party under so
much external pressure that the party executes a contract based on an improper
outside influence, not free will, destroying the party's free agency.95 The defense
of duress prevents a stronger party from presenting an unreasonable choice of
alternatives and thereby taking advantage of a weaker party." By exerting power
and control over the terms of the agreement, the aggressor substitutes its will for the
will of the other party and the agreement becomes "an agreement emanating
entirely from [the aggressor's] own mind" rather than a "mutual, voluntary
agreement." 97
In Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips,98 Hooters informed its employees that
if they refused to sign the arbitration agreement, they would forfeit all future
promotions. 99 The district court determined that the employee could not invalidate
the arbitration agreement on the basis of economic duress because there was no
evidence showing Hooters committed any kind of wrongful act.' Furthermore,
90. Id. at 562, 437 S.E.2d at 24.
91. Id. at 563, 437 S.E.2d at 24.
92. See supra note 58.
93. See Great W. Coal, 312 S.C. at 563, 437 S.E.2d at 24 ("Fraud as a defense to an arbitration
clause must be fraud specifically as to the arbitration clause and not the contract generally.").
94. Id. at 562-63, 437 S.E.2d at 24 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (finding that Section Four of the Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitration
clauses separable and valid)).
95. Willms Trucking Co. v. JW Constr. Co., 314 S.C. 170, 178, 442 S.E.2d 197, 202 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing Cherry v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Cas. Co., 191 S.C. 177, 183, 45 S.E.2d 123, 126
(1939)).
96. Troutman v. Facetglas, Inc., 281 S.C. 598, 602, 316 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Olson v. Horton, 258 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Minn. 1977)).
97. Willms Trucking, 314 S.C. at 179, 442 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting In re Nightingale's Estate, 182
S.C. 527, 547-48, 189 S.E. 890, 898 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998), aff'd, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 594.
100. Id. at 608 n.25 (citing Phillips v. Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 137, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1985)).
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Hooter's refusal to promote Phillips if she failed to sign the arbitration agreement
did not constitute a wrongful threat.'0 '
As the employee did in Hooters, parties will most often use duress as a defense
to an arbitration provision when they feel that, because of financial pressure, they
have no other choice but to sign an agreement. In South Carolina, a party can prove
duress by establishing the following elements:
(1) he has been the victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat,
(2) such act or threat must be one which deprives the victim of his
unfettered will, (3) as a direct result the coerced party must be
compelled to make a disproportionate exchange of values or give
up something for nothing, (4) the payment or exchange must be
made solely for the purposes of protecting the coerced party's
business or property interests, and (5) the coerced party must have
no adequate legal remedy.
10 2
Similar to the defenses of unconscionability °3 and fraud, °4 in order for a court to
invalidate an arbitration provision, the duress must relate to the arbitration
provision itself and not to the contract in general.0 5
E. Outside the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
A final common way for a party to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause
is to prove that the clause does not encompass a particular dispute.' 6 In determining
whether this is a valid defense, the court must consider "whether the factual
allegations underlying the claim are within the scope ofthe broad arbitration clause,
regardless of the label assigned to the claim."' 17 Because the policy of both the
federal and South Carolina courts favors arbitration, 1 8 parties struggle to defeat the
101. Id. at 608. This case demonstrates that the threshold for economic duress is very high. In
Hooters, the volition of the employee was not destroyed because her employment was not conditioned
on signing the arbitration agreement, only her ability to receive a promotion. Id. at 608 n.25.
102. Troutman v. Facetglas, Inc., 281 S.C. 598, 602-03, 316 S.E.2d 424, 427 (C. App. 1984)
(citing 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1617 (Walter H.E. Jaeger
ed., 3d ed. 1970)).
103. See supra note 58.
104. See supra notes 93-94.
105. See Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 540, 542 S.E.2d 360, 364 (2001) (citing
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967)); Linda Alle-Murphy,
Comment, Are Compulsory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts Enforceable" A Contractual
Analysis, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 125, 147 (2002) ("The Prima Paint decision should be read to require a
preliminary finding of fraud or unconscionability, duress, or waiver in the arbitration clause itself by
the court and not the arbitrators.").
106. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great W. Coal (Ky.), Inc., 312 S.C. 559, 563 64, 437 S.E.2d
22, 25 (1993) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 622 n.9
(1985); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 1988)).
107. Id.
108. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) (citing
Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co., 343 S.C. 396, 399, 540 S.E.2d 864, 865 (C. App. 2000)).
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presumption that a claim should be arbitrated. A court must find "with positive
assurance that the arbitration [agreement] is not susceptible to an interpretation that
covers the dispute before the court can find that a dispute falls outside the scope of
the agreement."' 0 9 Furthermore, if a South Carolina state law invalidates an
arbitration provision, the party seeking to enforce the agreement receives additional
judicial protection. The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the FAA
preempts state arbitration laws where interstate commerce is involved."0 Thus,
preemption may make particular agreements enforceable on both the federal and
state levels in cases where state law would otherwise deem the agreement
unenforceable."'
A phrase that has appeared in cases concerning the scope of an arbitration
clause states that "[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit."' 2
If read literally, this phrase may sound like a way to avoid arbitration; however, in
most cases, South Carolina courts will find that an arbitration clause encompasses
every dispute that could possibly arise between the parties. When a contract
contains a broadly worded arbitration provision, South Carolina courts have found
that the parties have agreed to submit all of their disputes to arbitration, not just
those disputes arising from the contract containing the arbitration clause." 3 In fact,
courts have interpreted from such expansive provisions that even disputes arising
from prior contracts are subject to arbitration because of the existence of the
arbitration clause in the later, disputed contract." ' However, where the arbitration
clause is narrowly drawn, courts have required that the dispute relate to the
underlying contract in order to be subject to arbitration. 115
109. Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 597, 553 S.E.2d at 118 (citing Great W. Coal, 312 S.C. at 564, 437
S.E.2d at 25) (emphasis added).
110. Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 538 n.2, 542 S.E.2d 360, 363 n.2 (2001)
(citations omitted).
111. See id.
112. See Zabinksi, 346 S.C. at 596, 553 S.E.2d at 118 (citing Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 269 S.C. 631, 641, 239 S.E.2d 647, 652 (1977); Towles v. United Healthcare Corp., 338 S.C. 29,
37, 524 S.E.2d 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 1999)).
113. See Vestry & Church Wardens of the Church of the Holy Cross v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
356 S.C. 202, 207-08, 588 S.E.2d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).
114. See Cara's Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566, 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1998)
(interpreting an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to ... any aspects of the relationship" to mean that conflicts between the parties were subject
to arbitration, not just conflicts arising under the contract containing the arbitration clause).
115. Vestry, 356 S.C. at 208 09, 588 S.E.2d at 139. In Vestry, both defendants sought to compel
arbitration. Id. at 206, 588 S.E.2d at 138. The plaintiff entered into a contract, which did not contain an
arbitration clause, with defendant Orkin for the inspection and treatment of termites in the church
building. Id. at 205, 588 S.E.2d at 137. Orkin terminated the contract several years later because the
plaintiff failed to make two consecutive payments. Id. at 205, 588 S.E.2d at 138. The church
subsequently entered into a second contract with Orkin nearly fifteen years later, which contained a
narrowly worded arbitration clause stating that "ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING
TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE SERVICES PERFORMED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT OR
TORT BASED CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL OR BODILY INJURY OR DAMAGE TO REAL OR
PERSONAL PROPERTY SHALL BE FINALLY RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION." Id. at 210,588
S.E.2d at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike the motion to compel from the defendant
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The leading case in South Carolina on the scope of arbitration clauses is
Zabinski v. Bright Acres Associates. 116 In Zabinski, the South Carolina Supreme
Court set forth the test for determining whether a disputed issue falls within the
scope of an arbitration provision. The court stated that a broadly worded arbitration
clause will subject a dispute to arbitration even when the dispute does not arise
from the underlying contract if "a 'significant relationship' exists between the
asserted claims and the contract in which the arbitration clause is contained."
117
Stated differently, if a contract containing a broadly worded arbitration clause
exists, both parties may be bound to arbitrate any and all claims that arise between
them, perhaps even if the disputes relate only peripherally to the underlying
contract. The analysis in Zabinski seems to add yet another layer of protection for
arbitration provisions, thus making it even less likely that a court will find that a
dispute is beyond the scope of an arbitration clause. The "significant relationship"
test the Zabinski court set forth, which had existed in prior Fourth Circuit
caselaw," 8 played a vital role in Justice Pleicones's dissent in Chassereau v.
Global-Sun Pools, Inc.' 19
Since 2001, South Carolina state courts have used the significant relationship
test to determine the scope of broadly worded arbitration clauses. 20 In Zabinksi,
four men had created a partnership in order to buy, renovate, and sell apartments.'
2'
The partnership agreement required "arbitration of all controversies or claims
arising out of the partnership agreement.' ' 22 Upon dissolution of the partnership,
two ofthe partners moved to compel arbitration in order to settle disputes involving
the distribution of partnership assets. 23 However, the parties also asserted third
party complaints regarding attorney malpractice and a purchase agreement made
between two of the partners for an interest in the partnership.'24 The court found
Terminix, whose initial contract contained a broadly worded arbitration clause, id at 213, 588 S.E.2d
at 142, Orkin's motion to compel arbitration failed because "[t]he terms chosen by Orkin to define the
scope of its arbitration agreement are wholly ineffective to broaden its application to pre-existing claims
involving unrelated real property," id at 211,588 S.E.2d at 141. This case underscores the importance
of an attorney's word choice in creating what is intended to be a binding arbitration clause.
116. 346 S.C. 580, 553 S.E.2d 110 (2001).
117. Id. at 598, 553 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001))
(emphasis added).
118. See Long, 248 F.3d at 316-17.
119. 373 S.C. 168, 173 75, 644 S.E.2d 718, 721 22 (2007) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
120. See Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 598, 553 S.E.2d at 119.
121. Id. at 585-86, 553 S.E.2d at 112. Each of the four partners owned an equal share of the
partnership. Id. When Leutwiler, one of the partners, died, one of the three remaining partners, Massey,
decided to purchase the decedent's quarter of an interest in the partnership. Id. at 586, 553 S.E.2d at
113. Westmoreland-the attorney for Leutwiler's estate who also created the partnership agreement-
drew up the purchase agreement, which Massey eventually breached by failing to make all of the
required payments. Id. When the partnership dissolved, there was disagreement as to the extent of
Massey's interest in the partnership. Id. Zabinski and Brainard, the other remaining partners, brought
an action to compel arbitration of the dispute, based on the existence of the arbitration provision in the
partnership agreement. Id.
122. Id. at 586, 553 S.E.2d at 112 13.
123. Id. at 586, 553 S.E.2d at 113.
124. Id. at 586-87, 553 S.E.2d at 113.
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that the issues regarding the distribution of assets were within the scope of the
arbitration clause; 2 ' however, the claims concerning attorney malpractice and the
purchase agreement between two of the partners were not subject to arbitration.'26
Using the significant relationship test, the court found that these latter issues did not
arise out of the partnership agreement and that the facts surrounding the claims
were independent of the partnership agreement.'27 Thus, there was no significant
relationship between the claims and the underlying contract.' 28 Based on Zabinski,
the use of the significant relationship test in South Carolina caselaw before Aiken
v. World Finance Corp. of South Carolina and Chassereau stood on solid ground.
However, in these two recent decisions, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
developed an additional opportunity for parties seeking to avoid arbitration.
IV. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ARBITRATION LAW: AIKEN V. WORLD FINANCE CORP.
OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND CHASSEREA U V. GLOBAL-SUN POOLS, INC.
Aiken and Chassereau represent new developments in the field of arbitration.
In these two decisions, the South Carolina Supreme Court has done what the United
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to do'-limit the enforceability of all
arbitration clauses when the party seeking arbitration of a dispute has committed
an outrageous tort that caused the dispute.
A. Background of Aiken and Chassereau
In Aiken v. World Finance Corp. ofSouth Carolina,3 ° Richard Aiken acquired
personal loans from World Finance Corporation of South Carolina (World Finance)
between 1997 and 1999.3 Upon entering into each loan, Aiken and World Finance
also entered into a broad arbitration agreement.'32 Two years after Aiken had paid
off his last loan in 2000,133 employees of World Finance began using Aiken's
personal information to obtain fraudulent loans that they embezzled.' When Aiken
learned about the "misuse of his personal information," he sued World Finance
seeking damages for negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, unfair trade
practices, and outrage and emotional distress. 3 ' World Finance subsequently sought
to compel arbitration of the dispute.'36
125. Id. at 597-98, 553 S.E.2d at 119.
126. Id. at 598, 553 S.E.2d at 119.
127. Id. (citing Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001)).
128. Id.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
130. 373 S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705 (2007).
131. Id. at 146, 644 S.E.2d at 707.
132. Id. at 147, 644 S.E.2d at 707.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
[Vol. 59: 513
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss3/6
CONTRACT LAW
While the facts in Chassereau v. Global-Sun Pools, Inc.'3 7 are different from
those in Aiken, the underlying torts are equally offensive. Vicki Chassereau
purchased an above-ground pool from defendant Global-Sun Pools, Inc. (Global-
Sun). 3 ' Soon thereafter, problems began to arise with the pool, and Global-Sun
allegedly refused to repair them.'39 As a result, Chassereau stopped making
payments on the pool. 4 ° Ken Darwin, an employee of Global-Sun, then allegedly
began harassing her. 4 ' Chassereau alleged that Darwin repeatedly called her at her
workplace; revealed private information to her friends, family members, and
coworkers; and made defamatory statements about her to those same people.'42
Based on these events, Chassereau sued Darwin and Global-Sun Pools for
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the criminal offense of
unlawful communication.143 Global-Sun moved to compel arbitration and argued
that two of the documents executed during the course of sale required the parties
to arbitrate all claims.
144
B. A New Standard for Arbitration Cases
In both Chassereau and Aiken, the court determined that because the torts
committed were outrageous and unforeseeable, the plaintiffs could not have
possibly agreed to arbitrate those issues; thus, the arbitration clauses were
unenforceable with respect to the claims made. 41 In Aiken, the court stated that it
would "refuse to interpret any arbitration agreement as applying to outrageous torts
that are unforeseeable to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal business
dealings."' 4 6
In Zabinksi, the court used the significant relationship test and declared that
under a broadly worded arbitration clause, a dispute should be arbitrated as long as
a significant relationship existed between the dispute and the agreement to
arbitrate.' 47 However, inAiken and Chassereau, the scope of the arbitration clauses
differed significantly from each other. If the court had continued to apply the
137. 373 S.C. 168, 644 S.E.2d 718 (2007).
138. Id. at 170, 644 S.E.2d at 719.
139. Id. Chassereau had requested that Global-Sun provide her with a part that the pool needed
to function properly, but Global-Sun neither replaced the part nor repaired the pool. Chassereau v.
Global-Sun Pools, Inc., 363 S.C. 628, 630, 611 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ct. App. 2005), aff'd, 373 S.C. 168,
694 S.E.2d 718 (2007).
140. Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 170, 644 S.E.2d at 719.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-430 (2003) (defining the crime of unlawful
communication).
144. Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 170, 644 S.E.2d at 719.
145. Id. at 172 73, 644 S.E.2d at 720 21; Aiken v. WorldFin. Corp. of S.C., 373 S.C. 144, 151,
644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (2007).
146. Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151, 644 S.E.2d at 709. The court repeated this statement in Chassereau,
373 S.C. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720 (quoting Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151, 644 S.E.2d at 709).
147. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 598, 553 S.E.2d 110, 119 (2001) (quoting
Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001)); see also supra text accompanying notes 116 19
(discussing the significant relationship test).
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significant relationship test in the same manner, the outcomes might have been
different, especially in Aiken. 148 The clause at issue in Aiken was broad in nature
and attempted to cover all prior and future dealings between the parties. 49
However, the language in the arbitration agreement in the Chassereau case was
much narrower and required the parties to arbitrate any disputes related to the
agreement. 50 In both cases, the court determined that the plaintiffs' claims were not
subject to arbitration despite the differences in the scope of the two arbitration
provisions. 151
lnAiken, the court concluded that there was no significant relationship between
the claims and the underlying contract. 152 However, in Chassereau, the court did
not even mention the significant relationship test; only Justice Pleicones discussed
the test in his dissenting opinion.153 While purporting to use the significant
relationship test in Aiken, the court seemed to utilize a new test that replaced the
significant relationship teSt. 14 Under the arguably new test, a court must determine
if the claims are tortious, outrageous, and unforeseeable to a reasonable
consumer.15 5 If the claims are outrageous and unforeseeable, the court will refuse
to compel arbitration. 56 Presumably, the reasoning behind such a refusal is that
absent intention a court would not force a party to forego a traditional judicial
forum in favor of an arbitration proceeding where many procedural techniques will
be unavailable.1
5 7
There is a much stronger argument for the application of the foreseeability test
and the conclusion that a significant relationship did not exist based on the facts of
148. See Chassereau v. Global-Sun Pools, Inc., 363 S.C. 628, 634 35, 611 S.E.2d 305, 308 (Ct.
App. 2005), aff'd, 373 S.C. 168, 644 S.E.2d 718 (2007); Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151-52, 644 S.E.2d at 709.
149. Aiken, 373 S.C. at 147, 644 S.E.2d at 707. The clause stated,
ALL DISPUTES, CONTROVERSIES OR CLAIMS OF ANY KIND AND
NATURE BETWEEN LENDER AND BORROWER ARISING OUT OF OR IN
CONNECTION WITH THE LOAN AGREEMENT, OR ARISING OUT OF
ANY TRANSACTION OR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENDER AND
BORROWER OR ARISING OUT OF ANY PRIOR OR FUTURE DEALINGS
BETWEEN LENDER AND BORROWER, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO
ARBITRATION AND SETTLED BY ARBITRATION ....
Id.
150. Chassereau, 363 S.C. at 632 33, 611 S.E.2d at 307. The arbitration provision stated, "ANY
DISPUTES ARISING IN ANY MANNER RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT THAT CANNOT
BE RESOLVED BY NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO
MANDATORY, EXCLUSIVE AND BINDING ARBITRATION." Id. at 632,611 S.E.2d at 307.
151. See Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 172 73, 644 S.E.2d at 720 21; Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151, 644
S.E.2d at 709.
152. Aiken, 373 S.C. at 150, 644 S.E.2d at 708.
153. See Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 173-74, 644 S.E.2d at 721-22 (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (citing
Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 598, 553 S.E.2d 110, 119 (2001)).
154. The court does not refer to the foreseeability test for outrageous torts as a new test but rather
as "a more definitive rule for determining whether a significant relationship exists between a dispute
between parties to a contract and the underlying contract." Aiken, 373 S.C. at 151, 644 S.E.2d at 709.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
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Aiken .8 rather than on those facts in Chassereau. The loan contracts between Aiken
and World Finance had been satisfied in full, and hence terminated, when the
defendant began engaging in the tortious and criminal conduct.'59 However, the
court found that the timing issue was not relevant to the arbitration determination. 60
Instead, the majority focused on whether a reasonable consumer could have
foreseen that the contract would give rise to such outrageous behavior in the
ordinary course of business. 6' The court concluded that no reasonable borrower
could foresee, based on the contract, that personal information would be stolen.
6 2
Because the tortious and criminal conduct occurred after the parties fulfilled the
terms of the contracts, the actions seem especially unforeseeable and outrageous.
The fact that the defendant's agents engaged in criminal conduct further
demonstrates the outrageous and unforeseeable nature of the underlying actions.
Under both the new test requiring outrageous and unforeseeable conduct and the
significant relationship test, the behavior underlying Aiken's claims would have
placed the claims outside of the scope of the arbitration clause.
Chassereau's facts make the application of the foreseeability test for
outrageous torts a little more difficult.'63 In his dissent in Chassereau, Justice
Pleicones argued, "Under any conceivable definition of the word 'significant,'
actions taken in seeking to collect a debt must be significantly related to the
debt." 64 While the majority did not seem to disagree that a significant relationship
existed, it stressed that the plaintiff would not have expected someone from whom
she purchased a pool to commit acts amounting to the tort of outrage. 6 ' Clearly, a
person should foresee that nonpayment of a bill could result in a call from the bill
collector to remind the person of the bill's due date and to discuss payment options.
These actions would be the foreseeable results of nonpayment. However, one can
distinguish these hypothetical results from the results in Chassereau, which were
considerably more disturbing. 166 Using the foreseeability test established in Aiken,
the court had to determine whether Chassereau would have foreseen that Global-
Sun would call her at work and release her private information to her friends and
family. While Chassereau should have expected the bill collector to contact her at
work, she should not have expected Global-Sun to release her private information.
Perhaps the majority in Chassereau barely alluded to the original significant
158. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36 (discussing the facts underlying the claims in
Aiken).
159. Aiken, 373 S.C. at 146-47, 644 S.E.2d at 707.
160. Id. at 150-51,644 S.E.2d at 709.
161. Id. at 151, 644 S.E.2d at 709.
162. Id. Justice Pleicones disagreed with the majority on this point, arguing that identity theft was
a foreseeable consequence of the loan agreement, even though he agreed with the majority that parties
to a loan agreement do not intend for such behavior to be "within the ambit of the contract." Id. at
152 53, 644 S.E.2d at 710 (Pleicones, J., concurring).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44 (discussing the facts relevant to the court's
decision in Chassereau).
164. Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 175, 644 S.E.2d at 722 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720 (majority opinion).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42 (discussing the behavior of Global-Sun in
response to Chassereau's nonpayment).
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relationship test because there was a significant relationship between Chassereau's
claims and the underlying contract, which, under Zabinski, arguably could subject
the claims to arbitration.'67 However, using the foreseeability test for outrageous
torts from Aiken, the court easily concluded the plaintiff could never have intended
to arbitrate such outrageous, unforeseeable claims.'68 Arguably, Chassereau's
claims would have been subject to arbitration under the significant relationship test
but were not subject to arbitration under the apparently new foreseeability test,
which requires the claims to be foreseeable by a reasonable consumer.
V. CONCLUSION
By requiring that torts be reasonably foreseeable to fall within arbitration
clauses, the South Carolina Supreme Court has limited the reach of arbitration
provisions where the dispute involves an outrageous tort. While this requirement
may confuse some sellers of consumer goods and services, the court's decision is
likely a fair and logical decision that "promote[s] the procurement of arbitration in
a commercially reasonable manner.'' 6 9
South Carolina has taken a bold step in the decisions ofAiken and Chassereau,
and other jurisdictions should follow this state's new approach to determining the
scope of arbitration clauses. By providing another method of protecting parties
trying to defeat enforcement of arbitration clauses in cases involving outrageous
torts, the South Carolina Supreme Court has established a more equitable doctrine
concerning the scope of arbitration agreements. Fearing that they would offend both
the state and federal policies favoring arbitration, courts throughout the nation have
made it virtually impossible' 0 for parties to receive judicial redress if the contract
between them contains an arbitration clause. The recent cases of Aiken' and
Chassereau should demonstrate to attorneys in this state that South Carolina has
decided that there is a limit to the scope of arbitration clauses foreseeability of the
dispute from the viewpoint of the reasonable consumer.
Stephanie R. Lamb
167. Pleicones emphasizes this point in his dissenting opinion. See Chassereau, 373 S.C. at 175,
644 S.E.2d at 722 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 172, 644 S.E.2d at 720 (majority opinion).
169. Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of S.C., 373 S.C. 144, 152, 644 S.E.2d at 705, 710 (2007).
170. See, e.g., MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942,947 (1 th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that the federal policy in favor of preemption may force a person who has not even signed a contract
to engage in arbitration); Univ. of Alaska v. Modern Const., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Alaska 1974)
(explaining that because of the policy in favor of arbitration, ambiguous contract terms can be construed
in favor of arbitration).
171. The Supreme Court recently denied World Finance's petition for writ of certiorari. World
Fin. Corp. of S.C. v. Aiken, 128 S. Ct. 497 (2007).
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